Emory Law Journal
Volume 71

Issue 7

2022

Normative Systems and Human Rights
Richard S. Kay

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard S. Kay, Normative Systems and Human Rights, 71 Emory L. J. 1583 (2022).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol71/iss7/10

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

KAY_6.22.22

6/23/2022 2:36 PM

NORMATIVE SYSTEMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Richard S. Kay
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1583
I. HUMAN RIGHTS AS RIGHTS ............................................................. 1584
II. KINDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ............................................................... 1589
A. Moral or Political Rights? ...................................................... 1590
B. Sources of Human Rights ....................................................... 1593
1. Natural Law ...................................................................... 1593
2. Positive Law ..................................................................... 1598
3. Human Rights and Multiple Normative Systems .............. 1603
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 1609
INTRODUCTION
It is both an honor and a pleasure to participate in this symposium celebrating
the extraordinary scholarly career of Michael Perry. I have been fortunate to
have known Michael Perry and his work for more than forty years. I have been
enriched and educated by his sensitive and insightful writing. His books and
articles are distinguished by thoughtfulness in substance and lucidity in
expression—qualities lamentably rare in legal scholarship. His work is also
marked by an unflinching honesty. He has no axe to grind apart from the
essential academic tasks of understanding and illuminating those subjects that
he has chosen to study. Finally, I am personally indebted to him for his
unfailingly kind assistance and encouragement. He has been a most valuable
colleague and friend.1


Wallace Stevens Professor Emeritus and Oliver Ellsworth Research Professor, University of
Connecticut School of Law. I am grateful for the essential editorial assistance of Ray Laguerre.
1
Before beginning, I feel obliged to state my distress at the decision of the editors of the Emory Law
Journal (who, in their dealings with me, have been consistently kind and professional) to withdraw their
invitation to publish the essay of a distinguished invited contributor to this project. This decision was apparently
based on their impression that the essay was racially insensitive and divisive. Having read the relevant paper
taken as a whole, that conclusion strikes me as harsh and unwarranted. Refusing publication based on
disagreement with an author’s opinions or point of view is the kind of thing which, practiced frequently enough,
is fatal to honest scholarship in law and humanities. I am dismayed that this controversy might in any way
distract from the honor due to Michael Perry, whose life and work I so profoundly admire. But in this context, I
feel a responsibility to insist on the critical importance of academic freedom, the value of which could not be
better exemplified than in the career of Michael Perry.
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One subject area to which Michael Perry has made sustained and important
contributions is human rights. He has produced useful commentary on human
rights as a matter of international law, domestic constitutional law, and moral
philosophy. This diversity of academic fields, all of which employ the
vocabulary of human rights, tells us something important about a central
problem in the academic literature. That is the unsettled and apparently
unresolvable question of where human rights come from, which is pretty much
the same question as what human rights are. In this essay, I will briefly review
this issue. I conclude that the search for a unified justification for human rights
is necessarily futile. The phrase “human rights,” as used in our rhetoric and in
our practice, refers to rules of conduct that arise from different normative
systems. The failure to keep this aspect of the term in view is at least partly
responsible for the seemingly endless disputes in the scholarly literature.
In Part I, I document the almost universal recognition that the phrase “human
rights” stands badly in need of better definition—or definitions. I then describe
a critical consequence of the fact that human rights must, first of all, be
understood as “rights.” Like all rights, human rights only make sense as part of
some system of preexisting norms. In Part II, I examine some of the normative
systems that appear to be implicated in one or another discussion of human
rights. I start, in Part II.A, with one of the major divides in the literature: the
distinction between “moral” and “political” interpretations of human rights. I
attempt to show that these two schools of thought can be understood as referring
to two different systems of norms. Then, in Part II.B, I briefly consider some
other normative systems, each of which appears to play some part in explications
of human rights. The human rights protections that stem from each of these
systems will be different with respect to sources of legitimacy, procedures, and
remedies. In Part III, I consider some consequences of this state of affairs for
human rights discourse and practice. The many kinds of human rights will often
overlap and be mutually reinforcing. But, inevitably, sometimes they will be
contradictory. In Part IV, in light of the data presented, I restate my principal
conclusion: a single conceptual model of human rights will never be able to
account for the variety of phenomena in the world today, all of which lay claim
to the title of human rights.
I.

HUMAN RIGHTS AS RIGHTS

No ideology in the world today is more widely embraced than that of human
rights. Writing in 1978, Louis Henkin accurately said of human rights that “[a]ll
civilizations proclaim their dedication to them; all the major religions proudly
lay claim to fathering them; every political leader and would-be leader makes
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them his platform.”2 As Michael Perry noted in a recent book, “[E]ven among
countries that do not take human rights seriously, an ever-diminishing number
is willing to be seen as rejecting the political morality of human rights.”3 It has,
in the words of Justine Lacroix and Jean-Yves Pranchère, become a “sort of
global lingua franca” in international political discourse.4
This increasing regard for human rights has unsurprisingly been
accompanied by an explosion of academic literature. A substantial part of this
material is directed at speculation and argument about just what human rights
are. Writers on the subject often begin by citing a fairly standard definition,
namely that human rights are rights enjoyed by every human being solely as a
result of his or her status as a human being.5 However, this general formula
masks a multitude of differences and is itself almost always subject to both
significant qualifications and serious criticism. It is something of an
understatement when Perry says that “the term ‘human rights’ has no canonical
meaning.”6 Time does not appear to be narrowing the differences in the debate.7
As I will explain below, the difficulties associated with defining human rights
are largely a consequence of the fact that the term is often applied to quite
different things. In his 2017 book, A Global Political Morality: Human Rights,
Democracy, and Constitutionalism, Perry writes, “I want to emphasize, here at
the outset, that this book is about the political morality of human rights; it is not
about the international law of human rights.”8 Unfortunately, not every

2

LOUIS HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY, at xii (1978).
MICHAEL J. PERRY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM 4 (2017) [hereinafter PERRY, GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY].
4
JUSTINE LACROIX & JEAN-YVES PRANCHÈRE, HUMAN RIGHTS ON TRIAL: A GENEALOGY OF THE
CRITIQUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (2018).
5
See, e.g., PERRY, GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 3, at 7–8 (quoting John Tasioulas).
6
Michael J. Perry, Human Rights Theory, 1: What Are ‘Human Rights’? Against the ‘Orthodox’ View 2
(Emory Univ. Sch. of L. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Research Paper No. 15-349), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2597403. Perry’s own contribution to the ongoing discussion is unique and characteristically clear. A right
qualifies as a human right (in the moral dimension of human rights) only “if the fundamental rationale for
establishing and protecting the right—for example, as a treaty-based right—is that conduct that violates the right
violates the imperative to ‘act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood.’” PERRY, GLOBAL POLITICAL
MORALITY, supra note 3, at 25 (citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
7
See, e.g., MICHAEL K. ADDO, THE LEGAL NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 23 (2010)
(“[C]enturies of human rights analysis has not clarified or settled the conceptual question of what they are or
what they are for. . . .”); Jeremy Waldron, Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 117, 121 (Rowan Cruft et al. eds., 2015) (“There is still no settled consensus
about what it means to say that the right to φ is a human right . . . .”); James Griffin, Human Rights: Questions
of Aim and Approach, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES 3, 6 (Gerhard
Ernst & Jan-Christoph Heilinger eds., 2012) (stating human rights “may not be uniquely indeterminate among
ethical terms, but it is considerably more indeterminate than most of them”).
8
PERRY, GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 3, at 2.
3
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commentator on human rights is so careful to distinguish the various sources and
the various effects of human rights. This is, in part, a consequence of the fact
that “[h]uman rights as an idea has no specific intellectual home.”9 Rather, it is
“recognised, accepted[,] and applied in all intellectual disciplines, including
philosophy, anthropology, psychology, politics, sociology, economics, the
sciences and law.”10 But this multiplicity of sources has not deterred scholars
from seeking a single core understanding of the term. James Griffin, for
example, suggests that it is possible to identify “existence conditions . . . [and]
supply grounds for deciding [their] content . . . [and] resolve conflicts of human
rights” in the senses “used today by most philosophers, political theorists,
international lawyers, jurisprudents, civil servants, politicians, and human rights
activists.”11 And, while agreeing that the phrase “may legitimately be used in
various senses,” John Tasioulas has gone on to attempt to identify “a central or
focal sense of the concept, one which has explanatory priority in relation to the
others, at least within a theoretical enterprise aimed at a certain kind of
understanding or evaluation of aspects of our world.”12
It will be useful to start with the obvious. However used, the assertion of a
human right depends on an implicit assumption that a “right” is a particular kind
of phenomenon. There is presumably a reason for denominating certain conduct
as protected by a right “as opposed to interests, values, claims, goals, or moral
considerations of some other kind.”13 On the first day of law courses on human
rights, I used to ask students to discuss the difference between these two
propositions:
(A) Everyone should receive competent medical care, and
(B) Everyone has a right to competent medical care.
Students would generally agree that the second formulation appears to be a more
forceful expression of the judgment than the first. We tend to think that the
existence of a right to the status mentioned (receiving competent medical care)
carries a greater assurance that such status will be realized in fact, while the first
statement only expresses a moral judgment about the desirability of that status.
It is true that sometimes the language of rights may only be a way of manifesting
the intensity of the speaker’s belief. Thus, Richard Bilder aptly noted that “[t]o
9

ADDO, supra note 7, at 43.
Id.
11
Griffin, supra note 7, at 6.
12
John Tasioulas, Exiting the Hall of Mirrors: Morality and Law in Human Rights, in POLITICAL AND
LEGAL APPROACHES TO HUMAN RIGHTS 73, 76–77 (Tom Campbell & Kylie Bourne eds., 2018).
13
John Tasioulas, Taking Rights out of Human Rights, 120 ETHICS 647, 650 (2010).
10
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assert that a particular social claim is a human right is to vest it emotionally and
morally with an especially high order of legitimacy.”14 But a claim of a right
strikes most people as incorporating an additional element. That is, there would
still be a difference between the two sentences even if the first one read, “It is
essential and urgent that everyone receive competent medical care.”
It has been often noted that statements of rights necessarily refer to persons
or entities other than the rights holders.15 The existence of a right contemplates
a hypothetical “violation” of that right, one that involves an action or inaction
by some other person or thing.16 Perry has written that “[t]o say that A has a
right that B not do X to A is to say that B has a duty not to do X to A.”17 The
duty-bearer may be another person, a government (as is typically the case for
“human rights”), or a deity. We can assert rights against the climate (“I have a
right to one sunny day on my vacation”) or an inanimate object (“I have a right
to finish at least one email before my computer crashes”), but there is no such
thing as a perfectly self-regarding right.
This is evident in the categorization of “legal advantage[s]” set forth by
Wesley Hohfeld in his classic analysis.18 Hohfeld attempted to distinguish four
particular kinds of advantages, all of which were typically referred to by the
umbrella term, “right”: (1) a right (properly so-called), (2) a privilege, (3) a
power, and (4) an immunity.19 But Hohfeld was also clear that each kind of
“right” had its own “co-relative”: (1) a duty (properly so-called), (2) a no-right,
(3) a liability, and (4) a disability.20 In each case, the co-relative was borne by

14
Richard B. Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic Questions, 1969 WIS. L. REV.
171, 174 (1969); see also John Kleinig, Human Rights, Legal Rights and Social Change, in HUMAN RIGHTS 36,
39 (Eugene Kamenka & Alice Erh-Soon Tay eds., 1978) (“[T]here are reasons for doubting that, for many in
contemporary society, talk of ‘human’ rights is anything more than a form of words.”).
15
See John Tasioulas, On the Foundations of Human Rights, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 45, 45 (explaining human rights as “rights possessed by all human beings simply
in virtue of their humanity”).
16
See PERRY, GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 3, at 16.
17
Id. (emphasis added); see also Rowan Cruft, Human Rights as Rights, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES, supra note 7, at 129, 137 (“[S]omething cannot be a right if it lacks
some such relation to directed duties.”).
18
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
23 YALE L.J. 16, 38 (1913).
19
Id. at 30.
20
Id. at 30–33.
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some other person or entity.21 It follows that “[t]he concept of a right is fully
unravelled in the idea of ‘a right against another.’”22
The point, for my purposes, is that the assertion of rights is one way of
limiting and adjusting relations between and among people. John Austin said
that a legal right necessarily involves three parties: “a party bearing the right; a
party burdened with the relative duty; and a sovereign government setting the
law through which the right and the duty are respectively conferred and
imposed.”23 As the anthropologist Sally Falk Moore put it, “All legal rights and
duties are aspects of social relationships. They are not essentially rights in things,
though they may pertain to things. They are rights to act in certain ways in
relation to the rights of other people.”24
What these quotations say about legal rights is, with minor qualifications,
equally true of any kind of right. A right is an aspect of a human relationship
regulated by a binding norm. More specifically, it is that aspect of the norm that
may be cited by a party to the relationship to spotlight an advantage that the
relevant norm confers on him or her. As James Allan notes, “[R]ights and duties
are themselves tied together by the concept of rules. Any right you care to
mention I can transliterate into the form of a rule.”25 Jeremy Bentham thought
that the only rules that gave rise to rights, properly so-called, were legal rules:
“Rights are, then, the fruits of the law, and of the law alone. There are no rights
without law—no rights contrary to the law, no rights anterior to the law.”26And
memorably, he described a right independent of law as a “round square” or “a
sort of dry moisture.”27 Only slightly more expansively, Alasdair MacIntyre
insisted that a right exists only in connection with “some particular set of
institutional arrangements” and “will always be institutionally conferred,
21
Id. H.L.A. Hart discussed the possibility that a “liberty” (which Hohfeld treated as “the same thing as
privilege”) does not entail that “someone else has any duty.” The law makes effective the authorization to take
an action that a liberty may protect by means of its general criminal and civil prohibitions on interferences with
such actions. See H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 179 (1955).
22
Christopher Arnold, Analyses of Right, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 14, at 74, 76.
23
John C. Gray, Some Definitions and Questions in Jurisprudence, 6 HARV. L. REV 21, 27 (1892)
(quoting JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE STUDY OF
JURISPRUDENCE 284 (Weidenfeld & Nicholson eds. 1954)).
24
Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate
Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC. REV. 719, 734 (1973) (citing WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS (1964)).
25
James Allan, Human Rights, Doubts and Democracy, in POLITICAL AND LEGAL APPROACHES TO
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 113, 113.
26
3 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 221 (John Bowring ed., 1843), quoted in
H.L.A. Hart, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 82 (1982).
27
1 JEREMY BENTHAM, JEREMY BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS 334–35 (W. Stark ed., 1952), quoted
in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 82 (1982).

KAY_6.22.22

2022]

6/23/2022 2:36 PM

NORMATIVE SYSTEMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

1589

institutionally recognized[,] and institutionally enforced.”28 But there is no
reason to restrict the use of “rights” to these particular kinds of normative
systems. To the extent that individuals accept the authority of a common set of
norms, one can rationally invoke it to claim a benefit which that system confers.
Those norms may be legal, institutional, customary, religious, or moral.29 The
critical element is the shared commitment of both the claimant and the obligor
to the authority of certain norms, so that, in the relevant context, they operate as
binding rules.30 And while the specification of norms may be more contestable,
this is no less true of moral rules and rights. A given morality, like a legal system,
is a collection of “precepts about how persons ought to act toward one
another.”31 It is the presumed force of a mandatory normative system that
distinguishes the assertion of a right from the expression of a mere preference or
value, even an intensely held preference or value.32 That is why the “right” to
competent health care in the sentences given above strikes us as stating a more
powerful claim. To have a right is to have an entitlement within a system that
has already been recognized as obligatory.
II. KINDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
If this understanding of the special character of rights is accepted, it may put
the inconclusive debates about the nature of human rights in a different light.
The fact that a human right may be an artifact of one of several normative
systems suggests that it is fruitless to inquire about the “real” or the “central”
feature of human rights.33 When considering whether a human right exists and
has been violated in a particular situation, it will always be necessary to ask how

28
PERRY, GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 3, at 22 (quoting ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, ARE
THERE ANY NATURAL RIGHTS? 12 (1983)).
29
Writing about “natural rights,” Justine Lacroix and Jean-Yves Pranchère say that it is impossible to
talk about such rights “except if one refers to the commandments of some natural law issued by a divine
sovereign. . . . [And for de Maistre] there could be no such thing as eternal rights and duties without an explicit
reference to a Legislator God.” LACROIX & PRANCHÈRE, supra note 4, at 96 (citations omitted).
30
See Jan Narveson, Human Rights: Which, if Any, Are There?, in HUMAN RIGHTS 175, 177 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1981) (“If it is insisted that laws underlie rights, then they will have to be
unwritten and unlegislated laws at bottom.”).
31
Alan Gewirth, The Basis and Content of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 119, 124;
see also Hart, supra note 21, at 177 (“[A] right belongs to that branch of morality which is specifically concerned
to determine when one person’s freedom may be limited by another’s . . . .”).
32
See Joseph Raz, Human Rights Without Foundations, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
321, 324 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010).
33
This approach has some things in common with the “pluralistic grounding of human rights” defended
by John Tasioulas. See Tasioulas, supra note 13, at 663. Whereas Tasioulas still wishes to identify “universal”
human rights by reasoning from multiple kinds of human interests, the view in text assumes that the fields of
application of various human rights will be limited as a result of their differing sources of legitimacy. See id.
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this right is believed to have achieved its status and then to apply the appropriate
criteria dictated by the rule-system that specifies its force in the relevant
circumstances. In this Part, I will briefly review some of the normative regimes
from which human rights may develop. But first, I will discuss how this way of
understanding human rights applies to one of the major divides in the
philosophical literature.
A. Moral or Political Rights?
At first glance, the distinction between “moral” and “political” conceptions
of human rights that consumes much of the current academic writing on human
rights may not appear to track the differences in the relevant normative systems
just discussed. The “moral view” sees human rights as attributes of a universal
morality prescribing proper and improper human conduct. It, therefore,
complements the standard characteristic of these rights as those that belong to
every person simply because of each person’s standing as a human being.34
Naturally, there are a number of such moralities and the sets of rights attached
to them differ accordingly.35 Recently, attention has focused on the idea of
“human agency” advanced by Alan Gewirth and later by James Griffin.36 This
view identifies a primary human value as the capacity to form and direct one’s
own life.37 The corresponding human rights are limited to protecting activities
that are essential to such a capacity.38 In Griffin’s version, these are the activities
necessary for the maintenance of personal autonomy and liberty.39 As logical as
such specifications may be, however, they do not match up with the wide and
evolving assortment of rights appearing in the various international human rights
instruments existing and proposed in the world today. This should not surprise.
As Gewirth conceded, his enterprise was “normative,” “refer[ring] to what
entitlements legal enactments and social regulations ought to recognize, not or
not only to what they in fact recognize.”40
It is partly the moral explanation’s deviation from the substance of current
human rights discourse that underlies the alternative, “political” conception. On
this view, it only makes sense to speak of human rights in connection with
34
See, e.g., Erasmus Mayr, The Political and Moral Conceptions of Human Rights—A Mixed Account,
in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES, supra note 7, at 73, 73.
35
See ALLEN BUCHANAN, THE HEART OF HUMAN RIGHTS 252 (2013) (describing “ethical pluralism”).
36
ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATIONS 15–16 (1982); JAMES
GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS 32–33 (2008).
37
GRIFFIN, supra note 36, at 32–33.
38
Id. at 33–34.
39
Id.
40
Gewirth, supra note 31, at 120.
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existing human rights practice. This “practice,” according to Joseph Raz,
consists of “ratifying conventions, enacting legislation, and adopting other
measures in the name of human rights; litigating, implementing, applying, and
so on, those so-called human rights measures; advocating observance and
incorporation into law of other so-called human rights, and more.”41 These
political human rights do not derive (or do not derive exclusively) from
philosophical speculation on what it means to be human. They are rather
observed in the actual expressions of political actors regarding “particular
historic circumstances.”42 This “practical conception takes the doctrine and
practice of human rights as we find them in international political life” and
makes “no assumption of a prior or independent layer of fundamental rights
whose nature and content can be discovered independently” of the actual
practice.43
Adopting John Rawls’s suggestion in his The Law of Peoples about how
human rights arguments were actually used, some writers have focused attention
on the fact that participants in human rights practice apply the terminology to
justify interference by international political actors in the internal affairs of
another country.44 Human rights violations, that is, constitute an exception to
what had been a cardinal principle of international law: “[T]hat a state’s
treatment of its own nationals is a matter exclusively within the domestic
jurisdiction of that state, i.e. is not controlled or regulated by international
law.”45 The emergence of this exception after the atrocities of the mid-twentieth
century, represented a profound change in the political assumptions about the
ethical obligations of states.46
In contrast to this “political” understanding, the “moral” view of human
rights is pre-political in the sense that it depends solely on assumptions about
the nature of human beings, whereas the “political” approach arises only as an
inference from statements and actions of political actors. Raz says that

41
Joseph Raz, On Waldron’s Critique of Raz on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: MORAL OR
POLITICAL? 139, 140 (Adam Etinson ed., 2018).
42
Id. at 141.
43
CHARLES R. BEITZ, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 102 (2009).
44
JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 79–80 (1999).
45
J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 291
(Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963).
46
Louis Henkin, International Human Rights as “Rights,” in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 257, 257–
58; M.W. Janis, Individuals as Subjects of International Law, 17 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 61, 65–66, 73–74 (1984).
This development may be an aspect of what Richard Rorty called “sentimental education[,] . . . expand[ing] the
reference of the terms ‘our kind of people’ and ‘people like us.’” 3 RICHARD RORTY, TRUTH AND PROGRESS:
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 176 (1998).
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“[d]isabling the defence ‘none of your business’ is definitive of the political
conception of human rights,” which “need not be universal or foundational.”47
Or, in Charles Beitz’s pithy remark, “[i]t is not part of international doctrine—
that human rights are ‘out there,’ existing in some separate normative order.”48
Insofar as this understanding defines “a human right simply in virtue of the type
of external response that is appropriate when it is violated,”49 it is unclear how
it can be usefully compared with the competing moral designation. The two
criteria appear to examine possible rights for the presence of incommensurable
characteristics. Indeed, Raz effectively accepted that this may be a case of apples
and oranges when he clarified his position by acknowledging that there may
indeed be a sense in which certain rights are “held by all human beings in virtue
of their humanity,” but that even such “true human rights theories should not be
the standards by which to judge human rights practice.”50
It is also possible, however, to see this controversy as one involving a
comparison of two implicit normative systems. Exponents of moral rights
necessarily refer to some independent canons of behavior. As will be further
discussed below, this view is in many ways the descendant of the natural law
philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.51 A background “system
of morality” grounds these claims, just as a legal system grounds claims of legal
rights.52 Referring to Bentham’s argument that “rights to do some action . . .
arise from the absence of legal obligation not to do it,” H.L.A. Hart saw no
reason that it “should not be applied mutatis mutandis to conventional
morality.”53 So, John Locke thought natural law was “that Law which God has
set to the actions of men.”54 But reliance on rights that are inferred from the
modern political “practice” of human rights also involves the application of a
collection of rules. In this case, the rules are not—or not as obviously—deduced
from some set of axiomatic principles. They are rather inferred from the actual
statements and behaviors of the participants in the practice. It is true that this
practice may consist of “a plurality of diverse political arrangements based on a

47

Raz, supra note 32, at 332.
BEITZ, supra note 43, at 54.
49
Jeremy Waldron, Human Rights: A Critique of the Raz/Rawls Approach, in HUMAN RIGHTS: MORAL
OR POLITICAL?, supra note 41, at 117, 136 (criticizing this approach).
50
Raz, supra note 41, at 141.
51
See infra Part II.B.1.
52
See J. Roland Pennock, Rights, Natural Rights, and Human Rights—A General View, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 1, 6.
53
HART, supra note 26, at 84–85.
54
Hannah Dawson, The Normativity of Nature in Pufendorf and Locke, 63 HIST. J. 528, 539 (2020)
(quoting JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 71, 352 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., 1975)).
48

KAY_6.22.22

2022]

6/23/2022 2:36 PM

NORMATIVE SYSTEMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

1593

range of ill-defined values.”55 Still, Beitz assumes that even though its contents
are many and varied, it is possible to observe a catalog of actions and statements
and to distill from them a “global normative order.”56 This order consists of the
“publicly available, critical practical standards to which agents can appeal in
justifying and criticizing actions and policies proposed or carried out (or not) by
governments.”57 As was the case with “moral” rights, the processes of
identification and expression of the norms derived from political practice will
be inexact and contestable.58 But people familiar with the development of
common law are unlikely to find this difficulty insurmountable for either kind
of human right. It is possible, therefore, to regard the ongoing debate between
proponents of the “moral” and “political” conceptions of human rights as posing
a choice between two different normative systems.
B. Sources of Human Rights
It may be useful to review many, though certainly not all, of the more
obvious normative systems that underlie contemporary human rights rhetoric. It
should also be clear, as Duncan Ivison has observed, that “[p]ublic reasoning
about rights, whether in domestic or global contexts, requires acceptance of what
Rawls called the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ regarding the ultimate grounds
of their justification.”59
1. Natural Law
There is some disagreement about how directly our modern human rights
discourse follows from the historic philosophy of natural law. Those affirming
such a derivation see it as an easy inference from the fact that both traditions
purport to identify norms of behavior that transcend political and temporal
boundaries. John Finnis, one of natural law’s most prominent modern
proponents, citing “Gaius in the second century A.D.” and Thomas Aquinas,
among others, found modern human rights to “track[] the conceptual map of
what an earlier way of speaking called natural right(s).”60
55
Tom Campbell, Human Rights Morality and Human Rights Practice: An Interactive Approach, in
POLITICAL AND LEGAL APPROACHES TO HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 3, 6.
56
BEITZ, supra note 43, at 209.
57
Id. at 210.
58
In the case of human rights premised on moral grounds, the existence of multiple systems of morality
and the difficulty of specifying determinate rules from such systems makes the process inherently controversial.
See, e.g., Gewirth, supra note 31, at 120.
59
Duncan Ivison, Traces of Recognition: Rights and Political Realism, in POLITICAL AND LEGAL
APPROACHES TO HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 28, 36.
60
3 JOHN FINNIS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMMON GOOD: COLLECTED ESSAYS (2011); MICHAEL J. PERRY,
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There is more than one kind of natural law. Advocates originally understood
it as a derivative of divine law. Not surprisingly, religious conviction has been
and continues to be in the conversation whenever the basis of human rights or
any of its predecessors is at issue.61 Michael Perry has argued that belief in the
binding character of such rights crucially depends on a person’s sense of
obligation toward every other person, and that such a sense can only develop
with sufficient intensity from recognition that “the Other, too, is, in the deepest
possible sense—i.e., as a child of God—your sister/brother.”62 Other
constructions of natural law incorporate a cruder but more straightforward place
for God’s commandments. In the Declaration of Independence, the American
founders were explicit that individuals had been “endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights.”63 Indeed, according to Joseph de Maistre, the only
way human beings could be vested with rights that trump the edicts of the human
state was if the rights were based on the existence of rules promulgated by the
“Legislator God.”64
There were two ways in which the laws of God were accessible to mortals.
One was direct revelation,65 but they could also be deduced by observing God’s
preferences in the structure of the world that He created and then applying “Godgiven ‘right reason.’”66 The seventeenth century jurist Samuel von Pufendorf
also explicitly linked nature’s laws with God’s commandments to men.67 The
mere natural inclinations of human beings could not, by themselves, rise to the
status of law since all law “supposes a Superior Power.”68 Therefore, “the
Obligation of Natural Law proceeds from GOD himself, the Great Creator and
Supreme Governour of Mankind.”69 In this way, by imbuing human beings with
the capacity to observe and understand the workings of nature, God could make

THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 3 (1998) [hereinafter PERRY, FOUR INQUIRIES] (stating human
rights are arguably “a modern version of the natural law theory, whose origins we can trace back, at least to the
Stoic philosophers . . . .” (quoting LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI, MODERNITY ON ENDLESS TRIAL 214 (1990)). Further
evidence of the connection—at least as far back as the Enlightenment version of natural rights thinking in the
late-eighteenth century—is found in the fact that, although modern English speakers now speak of “human
rights” rather than “natural rights,” both phenomena in French bore, and continue to bear, the identical name
“droits de l’homme.” See SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 24–26 (2010).
61
See Dawson, supra note 54, at 537–39 (discussing this relationship in early modern western thinkers).
62
PERRY, FOUR INQUIRIES, supra note 60, at 19.
63
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
64
LACROIX & PRANCHÈRE, supra note 4, at 96 (citations omitted).
65
HENKIN, supra note 2, at 5.
66
Id.
67
SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 112–14 (trans. Basil Kennet, Oxford
1703).
68
Id. at 112.
69
Id. at 113.

KAY_6.22.22

2022]

6/23/2022 2:36 PM

NORMATIVE SYSTEMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

1595

His commands known in ways additional to his “Reveal’d Word.”70 The main
point is that even though each of the various iterations of divinely created natural
law and each of the particular rules inferred from such law was contestable, it
was still a binding code of conduct. John Austin, the great philosopher of
positive law, was quick to acknowledge the existence and paramount force of
divine law, and he identified such law—the “law[] set by God to his human
creatures”—with “‘the law of nature;’ ‘natural law;’ ‘the law manifested to man
by the light of nature or reason;’ ‘the laws, precepts, or dictates of natural
religion.’”71
Once it was deemed possible to apprehend universal law by the application
of human reason to the facts of the natural world, it did not take long for some
thinkers to dispense with the legislative role of the deity. Secular versions—
“natural law theories without God”72—have been with us ever since. For reasons
already explained, such rights “hav[e] [a] place only in a system of morality.”73
Now, we have to locate “the notion of human rights within the best overall
understanding of ethics, showing that it earns its place there.”74 The rules
underlying these rights cannot bind with the kind of external force associated
with either divine or legal injunctions.75 But the personal commitment of the
individuals who accept a given system of morality can still give rise to a sense
of obligation that may be comparably effective. Enlightenment thinkers were
able to reason their way to a code of morality regulating the way human beings
should behave inter se, and from which followed the essential requirements and
limits of any social organization.76 Such a morality may be constructed upon
what its exponents take to be basic and obvious ingredients of human well-being.
This is the idea that, as Perry puts it, “all (or virtually all) human beings share
some significant characteristics, [and] in that sense they share a ‘nature’, in
virtue of which some things are good for every human being.”77 Various
70
Id. at 114. For a valuable examination of natural law thinking in this period focusing on Pufendorf and
Locke, see generally Dawson, supra note 54.
71
AUSTIN, supra note 23, at 34. Austin was willing to include this divine law in the category of positive
law insofar as it issued from “a certain source.” Id. at 134.
72
Allan, supra note 25, at 116.
73
Pennock, supra note 52, at 6.
74
Tasioulas, supra note 13, at 648.
75
Cf. PERRY, GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 3, at 21 (discussing the elements of force
underlying social and moral rights).
76
HENKIN, supra note 2, at 9. In this, I disagree with John Tasioulas’s suggestion that “when the
theological interpretation [of natural law] was abandoned, ‘nothing was put in its place.’” Tasioulas, supra note
13, at 647–48 (quoting GRIFFIN, supra note 36, at 2).
77
PERRY, FOUR INQUIRIES, supra note 60, at 68; see also id. (“According to this position, the fundamental
subject matter of morality is human well-being; according to the natural-law conception of the subject matter of
moral knowledge, moral knowledge is knowledge of or about the constituents and conditions of human
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versions of this basic assumption underlie several of the best known “moral”
defenses of human rights, including those put forward by John Finnis, Alan
Gewirth, and James Griffin.78
This definition of human rights suggests an interesting and important
approach to the subject recently raised by Perry in A Global Political Morality.
If we believe that our morality is a way of identifying those goods and behaviors
that are essential to the “flourishing” of human beings as a species, it may make
sense to consult the observations of evolutionary biologists who study those
traits that improve the “fitness” of organisms. Perry cites the research of the
primatologist and ethologist, Frans de Waal, who has studied the persistent role
of altruistic behavior in species “from elephants to wolves and people.”79 We
may infer from this research that performing acts of kindness—motivated first
perhaps by calculation but eventually by natural inclination—promotes
individual well-being and therefore results in enhanced survival insofar as it
anticipates reciprocal and co-operative conduct from one’s fellows.
Evolutionary theorists have sketched out various mechanisms through which
this kind of a predisposition could develop.80 Consequently, in some versions of
this development, regard for others ends up being an adaptation that promotes
the fitness of the species.
This picture mirrors the relationship between human choices and the natural
world that Hannah Dawson detected in her study of seventeenth-century
thinkers, working well before the emergence of a science of evolutionary
biology. She refers, for example, to Hugo Grotius, who claimed the following:
Like other animals—and here the self-sacrificial character of natural
sociability comes into view—men ‘forget’ ‘their own interest, in
favour of their young ones, or those of their own kind.’ Even children

flourishing or well-being.”); Campbell, supra note 55, at 5 (“Descriptive naturalists seek to provide a basis for
human rights in a secularized version of the sort of natural law theory which seeks to identify a number of
authentic human characteristics, capacities or needs derived from our knowledge and understanding of human
nature and human circumstances.”); FINNIS, supra note 60, at 4 (“Human persons share a nature that is known
by knowing the many and deeply varied objects that make sense of human acts . . . .”).
78
See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (2d ed. 2011); GEWIRTH, supra note 36;
GRIFFIN, supra note 36.
79
PERRY, GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 3, at 37 n.30 (quoting FRANS DE WAAL, PRIMATES
AND PHILOSOPHERS: HOW MORALITY EVOLVED 15 (2006)).
80
Alternative explanations for the evolution of a preference for fellow feeling are helpfully surveyed in
Stuart A. West, Ashleigh S. Griffin & Andy Gardner, Evolutionary Explanations for Cooperation, 17 CURRENT
BIOLOGY R661, R661 (2007). Martin Nowak has worked out the conditions for the various ways that cooperative
behavior might successfully evolve. Martin A. Nowak, Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation, 314
SCIENCE 1560, 1560–61 (2006).
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. . . completely unschooled in right and wrong, nevertheless have ‘a
propensity to do good to others.’81

This view is especially congenial to Perry’s argument that the morality of human
rights depends on “the conviction that the Other is, finally, one’s own
sister/brother—and should receive, therefore, the gift of one’s loving concern.”82
It is necessary, however, to balance this attractive picture of the direction of
human evolution with a different version. It is widely agreed that a tendency
towards cooperation may lead to improved fitness within a genetically
connected family or community.83 It is not so clear that this inclination must
extend to all the members of a very large population.84 Some theorists contend
that the disposition to mutual assistance may go so far as to extend to an entire
ethnic group.85 But mostly such explanations presume that evolved attitudes of
solidarity are limited to some genetically related or geographically fixed group86
and not to the entire species, as would need to be the case if we were to regard
it as a foundation of human rights. In fact, one of the major purposes of tribal
social cohesion is exactly its use in the competition with other families, an
enterprise for which the development of indifference or even hostility to
unrelated groups may well be a useful adaptation.87 To the extent that the result
of evolution is an attitude of what one study called “parochial altruism,”88 it is
unlikely to provide a firm basis for wide acceptance of human rights.
Recognition of these facts was evident in the argument of Richard Rorty (no
evolutionary theorist) that the propagation of belief in universal human rights
depends on “sentimental education” to overcome most people’s conviction that
“they live in a world in which it would be just too risky—indeed, would often
81
Dawson, supra note 54, at 553–54. Dawson also quotes St. Augustine’s City of God to the effect that
“‘[a] human being’ is ‘drawn by the laws of his nature’ beyond his nearest and dearest ‘to enter upon a fellowship
with all his fellow-men and to keep peace with them.’” Id. at 553.
82
PERRY, FOUR INQUIRIES, supra note 60, at 21. Perry has also cited similar research by political
psychologist Kristin Renwick Monroe. PERRY, GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 3, at 39.
83
On “kin selection,” see RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 89–94 (1989).
84
W.D. Hamilton, the progenitor of much of modern kin selection theory, thought that even attenuated
genetic relations could have an effect in larger communities. W.D. Hamilton, Innate Social Aptitudes of Man:
An Approach from Evolutionary Genetics, in BIOSOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 133, 142–43 (Robin Fox ed., 1975).
85
See Gustav Jahoda, On the Origins of Antagonism Towards “The Others,” 127 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
ETHNOLOGIE 1, 9 (2002) (discussing the views of the late sociobiologist scholar, Pierre Van den Berghe).
86
In fact, one of the major problems investigated by students of animal behavior is just how individuals
can recognize those group members upon whom it is advantageous to confer benefits. See West et al., supra note
80, at 661.
87
Thus, Richard Dawkins noted that “[b]lood-feuds and inter-clan warfare are easily interpretable in
terms of [W.D.] Hamilton’s genetic theory.” DAWKINS, supra note 83, at 99.
88
Jung-Kyoo Choi & Samuel Bowles, The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and War, 318 SCIENCE
636, 636 (2007).
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be insanely dangerous—to let one’s sense of moral community stretch beyond
one’s family, clan, or tribe.”89
2. Positive Law
The various forms of natural law surveyed above each provide plausible
bases upon which entitlements to human rights may be constructed. As may be
obvious, there are two difficulties: first, the intensely controversial nature of the
reasons supporting the authority of these normative systems; and second, the
obscurity of the correct method for extracting particular rules—and particular
rights—from each of them. One response to this problem is to enact human
rights, or adequate surrogates for some human rights, into positive law. But the
variety of positive law systems means that, perhaps even more than in the case
of natural law, there will be numerous and different legal orders underlying
human rights. I will touch briefly on several of these systems in this section.
Human rights can be protected in many categories of domestic law, in, as
Michael Addo has pointed out: “public law, private law, civil law, common law,
family law, [and] commercial law.”90 But the most obvious home for human
rights in municipal law is constitutional law. For the American founding
generation, who believed that the very purpose of the state was to protect natural
rights, constitutions were the perfect place to entrench those rights in legally
enforceable form.91 (In France, on the other hand, the adoption of the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen was not intended to subject the
legislative power to human rights, or in any event to judicial enforcement of
those rights. This was evidenced by the Law of 16-24 August 1790 explicitly
barring any official from “obstructing or suspending” legislative acts, a
prohibition enacted in the early French republican constitutions and largely
observed by the judiciary until the reforms of the Fifth Republic.92) Modern
constitutions invariably include some set of fundamental rights, and,
increasingly, they establish a procedure for challenging public acts claimed to

89

Rorty, supra note 46, at 176, 178.
ADDO, supra note 7, at 46.
91
By “the 1770’s, the state-of-nature or modem natural rights analysis appears to have been the dominant
theoretical justification for [American] revolution and written constitutions.” Philip A. Hamburger, Natural
Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 939 (1993); see id. at 937–44 (discussing
the ways in which American constitutional law was meant to reflect natural law).
92
James Beardsley, Constitutional Review in France, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 189, 192 (1975). For a thorough
account of the strict French approach to judicial enforcement of rights against the legislature, see generally id.
For an incisive comparison of the basic constitutional philosophies of the American and French revolutionary
statesmen, see generally IOANNA TOURKOCHORITI, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: THE REVOLUTIONARY ROOTS OF
AMERICAN AND FRENCH LEGAL THOUGHT (2022).
90
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infringe upon those rights. Michael Perry has powerfully argued that there is a
necessary relationship between judicially enforceable constitutions and human
rights, noting that a society embracing constitutionalism “should both entrench
in its fundamental law the human rights to which it is (or professes to be)
committed and authorize its courts to protect the rights by enforcing them.”93
These days, however, when we talk about the “law” of human rights, we
usually refer to international law. Like natural law and domestic law, however,
international law is not just one thing. It consists of multiple normative orders,
many of which declare an intention to protect what they call “human rights.”
The special role of international law in this mission may seem obvious insofar
as it relies on the idea that its norms apply to every human being, thus
transcending political boundaries. Using international law as the vehicle for
protecting human rights is also particularly congenial to the “political”
conception of human rights discussed earlier in which the rights provide a
standard for justifying interference by outside actors into the internal affairs of
another state.94 As already noted, the twentieth-century embrace of human rights
rules by drafters and practitioners of international law marked a qualitative break
with what had been one of its central axioms, namely the idea that it protected
and regulated only states—not individuals.95 So, in 1945, with the atrocities of
the fascist governments still vivid in the minds of the leaders of the victorious
states, the U.N. Charter made several references to “human rights.”96 At its very
beginning, the Preamble stated the parties’ determination to “reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights,” and Article 1 included encouragement of “respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all” as one of the purposes
of the organization.97 This recognition, as Louis Henkin put it, “ushered in [a]
new international law of human rights.”98
Commentators agree that a critical development in this transformation was
the United Nations’ adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948.99 Perry calls the Declaration “the foundational human rights document of

93

PERRY, GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 3, at 89.
See LACROIX & PRANCHÈRE, supra note 4, at 16–18 (contrasting the domestic role of “rights of man”
with the supranational use of “human rights”).
95
See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
96
U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 1; see also U.N. Charter arts. 13, 55, 62, 68, 76 (making further references to
human rights).
97
U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 1; see also U.N. Charter arts. 13, 55, 62, 68, 76 (making further references to
human rights).
98
HENKIN, supra note 2, at 94.
99
PERRY, GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 3, at 4.
94
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our time.”100 However, it is useful to remember that while the U.N. Charter is a
treaty that binds its member states in international law, the Declaration was
adopted on the explicit understanding that it was “a common standard of
achievement” but had no force in international law.101 As Perry notes, “[I]t is
not a treaty; it is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to
be a statement of law or of legal obligation.”102 The drafters of the Declaration
did, however, expect that the rights declared in that instrument should and would
later be codified in separate binding treaties. That process took eighteen years
and was largely completed in 1966 with agreement on two “Covenants”: one on
“Civil and Political Rights” and a second on “Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.”103 These were almost universally agreed to and ratified.104 As is the case
with most international law, however, these global human rights treaties have
only the most rudimentary machinery to deal with states that fail to observe the
Covenants’ standards.105
In addition to these U.N. treaties, however, there are several regional
conventions focusing on human rights, most notably the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and the Inter-American Convention on
Human Rights.106 These treaties (especially the former) are notable for the
formidable systems they have developed to adjudicate claims of violations and
allowing (again, far more practically in the European system) individuals to
initiate proceedings when they feel they have been victims of such violations.107

100

Id.
Id. (quoting 5 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 243 (Marjorie M. Whiteman ed., 1965)).
102
Id. at 19 (quoting 5 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 101).
103
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171;
United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3. There are various other human rights treaties that were agreed to both before and after the adoption of these
two covenants. These focus on more specific issues such as racial discrimination, women’s rights, and the rights
of refugees. See the full list in MARK WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 276 & n.75 (7th ed. 2016).
104
For a list of state signatories, see generally Status of Treaties: International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Apr. 30, 2022) (listing the signatories of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); Status of Treaties: International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Apr. 30, 2022 (listing the signatories of the Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights). As indicated in the second table cited, the Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights has not been ratified by the United States. Id.
105
See Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights: Need for Further Institutional Development,
50 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 9, 10–12, 15–16 (2018) (describing and criticizing these procedures).
106
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221; American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica,” Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123.
107
For a helpful review of the two systems, see JANIS, supra note 103, at 277–97.
101
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The member states of the European Union, all of whom are also parties to the
European Convention on Human Rights, are further subject to that
organization’s Charter of Fundamental Rights of 2000.108 The Charter contains
a similar but somewhat more extensive list of rights. It is applicable to the
institutions of the Union and also, under certain circumstances, to the acts of its
members.109 The interpretation of the Charter, like that of all European Union
law, is committed to the European Court of Justice.110 Insofar as some states will
be subject to both the Charter and the Convention, issues can arise in connection
with the coexistence of these regimes.111
In addition to these multiple and overlapping treaties, human rights
claimants may seek protection in customary international law. This law consists
of rules inferred from a uniform practice that states follow with “a sense of . . .
obligation.”112 The process of identifying such rules based on the behavior of
states is obviously highly imprecise. As Mark Janis notes, “The determination
of customary international law is more an art than a science.”113 The factors that
are taken into consideration are, as Janis observes, “exceedingly various.”114 In
many ways, arguments based on such law resemble the assertions rooted in the
several versions of natural law discussed above. Indeed, the precursor of
international law, the “law of nations,” was for a long time indistinguishable
from natural law.115 The difficulty of identifying these rules is multiplied by the
further assumption that their legal quality may be demonstrated by consulting
the opinions of academic commentators, the resolutions of international bodies,
and statements of best practices recommended by international organizations.116
108

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 2, 2000, 364 O.J.E.C. 1.
Id. at 9.
110
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 267, Mar. 25, 1957, 326 O.J.E.U. 47, 164.
111
For a recent discussion of a possible conflict between the European Court of Justice and the European
Court of Human Rights with respect to the application of European Arrest Warrants, see Luc von Danwitz, In
Rights We Trust, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Aug. 21, 2019), https://verfassungsblog.de/in-rights-we-trust/.
112
JANIS, supra note 103, at 48 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States §102(2) (Am. L. Inst. 1987)).
113
Id. at 46. In addition to this difficulty, a persistent problem for any customary law is figuring out how
the fact of widespread and long-time practice infuses that practice with normative force. See Richard S. Kay,
Changing the United Kingdom Constitution: The Blind Sovereign, in SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LAW: DOMESTIC,
EUROPEAN, AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 98, 112, 114–15 (Richard Rawlings et al. eds., 2013) (critically
evaluating arguments for such force).
114
See JANIS, supra note 103, at 50.
115
See id. at 62–65.
116
See id. at 48–50, 52–55; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 839 (1997) (stating
customary international law has become “less tied to state practice. International and U.S. courts now rely on
General Assembly resolutions, multilateral treaties, and other international pronouncements as evidence of
[customary international law] without rigorous examination of whether these pronouncements reflect the actual
109
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The increasingly wide acceptance of the moral and political force of human
rights norms, when combined with the broad range of matters that may justify a
finding of customary international law, opens the door to claims of human rights
violations even in cases where no human rights treaty covers the relevant
facts.117 Thus, although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was, at the
time of its promulgation, clearly understood not to be a treaty creating legal
obligations, over time, many human rights advocates have concluded that its
provisions have acquired the status of customary international law, therefore
binding every state.118
International law rights, whether created by treaty or identified in customary
law, are often legitimated as norms that the duty-bound states have, by their own
behavior, explicitly or implicitly acknowledged to be obligatory. A third set of
human rights, however—those arising from the existence of “peremptory
norms” (jus cogens)—can claim no basis in any kind of state consent.119 These
norms bind states automatically, and they may not be avoided even by contrary
custom or treaty. How a norm acquires this status is something of a mystery. The
authoritative Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a peremptory
norm as one “accepted and recognized by the international community of states
as a whole” as “a norm from which no derogation is permitted.”120 Despite the
insistence of some international lawyers to the contrary, this definition seems to
describe criteria more or less identical to those established for norms of
customary law. The potent effects of peremptory norms have commended them
to advocates of international human rights. There have been many candidates
for such norms, but few of them have attracted sufficient acceptance to be widely
recognized as such. The few exceptions are norms that prohibit such state
practices as torture, slavery, and genocide, although such rights are already
explicit or implicit in every other normative system from which human rights
develop.121

practice of states”).
117
See id. at 818, 841 (listing human rights claims based on customary international law).
118
See MOYN, supra note 60, at 207.
119
JANIS, supra note 103, at 65.
120
Id.
121
See id. at 68–69. Janis also suggests that the principles of state sovereignty might qualify as a
peremptory norm, something that would be in tension with the concurrent recognition of peremptory norms
establishing human rights.
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3. Human Rights and Multiple Normative Systems
What this superficial survey of the normative systems upon which human
rights claims may be founded shows is that our human rights practice and
rhetoric incorporate several very different things. Michael Perry’s statement at
the very beginning of A Global Political Morality—explaining that he was
writing about “the political morality of human rights” and not “the international
law of human rights”122—is a too rare recognition of that fact. As we have seen,
we use the same expression, “human rights,” to refer to the artifacts of different
normative systems. Each claimed violation of human rights can therefore be
understood only against the background of the appropriate system or systems—
whether voluntary or compulsory, universal or limited by geographic location or
personal status—from which the particular right in question arises. Some writers
have, in fact, emphasized a “pluralistic approach to the grounds of human
rights”123 or a “pluralistic justificatory methodology.”124 Acknowledging the
inevitability of this phenomenon, of course, means giving up the idea that human
rights have some platonic form, the nature of which we may apprehend by
continued reason and argument. Rather, as René Provost and Colleen Sheppard
have pointed out, human rights are “situate[d] . . . within multiple or plural legal
orders, including both formal and informal legal regimes,” leading to “a
fragmented, polycentric regime.”125 Human rights, that is, do not and cannot
escape the unavoidable consequences of the plural legal universes in which
individuals find themselves and in which these individuals can exploit the
opportunities and cope with the demands of the different rule systems of the
multiple communities of which they are members.126
The fact that human rights may arise from plural normative systems means
that the resulting rights will differ in ways that reflect their different points of
origin. Among other differences, rights derived from different systems will have
different legitimating etiologies; they will be differently interpreted, with
different means of enforcement and different remedies for their infringement.
The effectiveness of any asserted human right will be a function of the normative
force of the particular normative system from which it originates. So, a human
right inferred from a personal (that is, an unofficial) moral system will be

122

PERRY, GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 3, at 2.
Ivison, supra note 59, at 29. Ivison’s plurality of grounding, however, refers to multiple and different
moral bases for rights claims. See id. at 35.
124
BUCHANAN, supra note 35, at 53.
125
DIALOGUES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL PLURALISM 3, 5 (René Provost & Colleen Sheppard eds.,
2013).
126
See LEOPOLD POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY 111–12 (1971).
123
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respected by people holding to that system to a degree consistent with the
intensity of their commitment. It follows, for example, that a right arising from
sincere religious conviction may, in a given population, be more compelling than
one worked out from a similar moral code in the same population that has no
connection to divine sanction.
On the same reasoning, the legitimacy of rights grounded in positive law
will, by itself, be no greater and no less than the legitimacy of other rules arising
from the same legal system. Tracing the legitimacy of the relevant legal system
as a whole will differ, depending on the character of that system. So, typically,
the force of domestic law arises from “some political act that expresses the
consent of relevant political actors, or of peoples. National constitutions in the
liberal tradition are understood as originating in direct or indirect exercises of
popular sovereignty that provide one source of legitimation for the enforcement
of the rights they contain.”127 As noted, international law found in treaties or
other agreements has usually been treated as legitimate because it is believed to
follow from the assent of the contracting states. A similar rationale may be
applied to customary international law, insofar as the uniform behavior of states
may also be interpreted as a kind of approval.128 But the authority of some other
aspects of customary international law, especially rules or rights derived mainly
from conclusions drawn by judges and jurists, is more problematic. In theory,
this customary law is equally binding even if the regulated state’s consent is
absent.129 In any event, as Gerald Neuman has noted, “international treaty
regimes and national constitutional orders rest on distinct and incommensurable
sources of consensual legitimacy and authority, which can cause interpretations
of fundamental rights to diverge or to come into direct conflict.”130 Among the
possible consequences of such a conflict are differences in the case law produced
in national constitutional courts and that issuing from international human rights
courts, all working with superficially identical rights. Each tribunal will have its
own canons of interpretation based on its understanding of the nature of the legal
system that supplies the basis for the rights and of which, typically, the court is
itself a part.
Finally, various normative systems are associated with diverse enforcement
mechanisms, the nature and practical operation of which have resulted in
distinctly different kinds and degrees of protection. This is a result of both the
127
Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1863, 1866 (2003).
128
JANIS, supra note 103, at 5.
129
Neuman, supra note 127, at 1874–75.
130
Id. at 1876.
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character of the background normative system and the practical machinery, if
any, employed to make it effective. Human rights derived from natural or divine
law lack such machinery, marking a critical difference with positive law
enactments of rights. Similarly, comparing various “bills of rights” in municipal
constitutions requires evaluation not merely of the particular rights detailed in
the texts but also of the arrangements established to oversee their protection on
the ground.131 The same is true of international law rights. From the beginning
of its human rights enterprise, the United Nations has operated some kind of
human rights agency—first, a Human Rights Commission and later, a Human
Rights Council. But neither of these were charged with “enforcing” the rights in
the Universal Declaration and the various Covenants and Conventions created
pursuant to it. They have never gone beyond investigating and publicizing
violations.132 These institutions are widely agreed to have been, at best, only
moderately effective even in those limited tasks.133 A central problem has been
the politicization of the issues and decisions, something more or less inevitable
given the character of the United Nations. In contrast, the judicial apparatus of
the European Convention on Human Rights and the work of the 650 people who
staff its Registry134 have resulted in a system not unlike those in states with
established constitutional courts. The European Court of Human Rights has
developed a dense jurisprudence, and it has attracted wide respect as an effective
institution for interpreting and applying the Convention’s rights.135 While some
of its judgments have faced national resistance, they have, for the most part, been
complied with by the respondent states who have paid compensation to victims
and have revised offending national laws and institutions.136 Other regional or
specialized institutions relying on different normative systems have their own
peculiar strengths and weaknesses.137
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For a recent survey, see generally ADAM CHILTON & MILA VERSTEEG, HOW CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
MATTER (2020).
132
Douglas Dohono, Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century, 35 GA. J. INT’L. & COMP.
L. 1, 17–18 (2006).
133
For a balanced recent assessment of the U.N. Human Rights Council, see generally Sarah Joseph &
Eleanor Jenkin, The United Nations Human Rights Council: Is the United States Right to Leave this Club?, 35
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 75 (2019).
134
Human Rights Building, EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS., https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/
building&c= (last visited Apr. 30, 2021).
135
See Richard S. Kay, The European Human Rights System as a System of Law, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 55,
56–57 (2000).
136
See id.; Mark W. Janis, The Efficacy of Strasbourg Law, 15 CONN. J. INT’L L. 39, 46 (2000).
137
See e.g., Alexandra Huneeus & Mikael Rask Madsen, Between Universalism and Regional Law and
Politics: A Comparative History of the American, European, and African Human Rights Systems, 16 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 136, 137 (2018).
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This abbreviated description of the differences in human rights regimes
situated within different normative systems is sufficient to show how these
regimes reflect the distinct characteristics of those systems. Of course, these
versions of human rights will also have much in common, displaying a
substantial overlap with respect to the activities they protect, require, or forbid.
As noted, some commentators go further and suggest that one kind of right is
the pure form, distinct from and anterior to any of the historical normative
systems discussed here. Such writers assume that these “proto-human rights”
exist and “that they are rights, although it is not clear what kind of rights they
are and in what universe. Most plausibly they appear to be moral rights in an
accepted moral order, or even legal rights under some modern version of natural
law.” 138 On this view, legislated human rights are “reflections of nonlegal
principles that have normative force independent of their embodiment in law, or
even superior to the positive legal system.”139 In this respect, the legal rights are
“determinationes, that is, specifications and delimitations which when
reasonable could nonetheless reasonably have been different, in some or many
respects.”140 Allen Buchanan criticizes this way of understanding positive law
human rights. He calls it the “Mirroring View,” according to which “there is
only one concept of human rights, namely, the concept of moral human
rights . . . and that international human rights documents are attempts to list
moral human rights.”141 In contrast, in Buchanan’s view, legal rights “are what
they are” and “need not be embodiments of corresponding moral rights.”142
This is not to say that the rights deriving from different normative systems
are entirely independent. “We live in a world of multiple, overlapping normative
communities”143 and the norms of these communities “constantly interact and
intersect.”144 In the case of human rights, recognition of a given right as implicit
in a widely shared set of moral norms will usually precede its adoption as a
constitutional or international law human right. As Addo has written, “The
evolution of human rights in the legal sphere . . . [may be] an unplanned and

138
Henkin, supra note 46, at 263; see also BEITZ, supra note 43, at 49–50 (“[N]aturalistic conceptions
regard human rights as having a character and basis that can be fully comprehended without reference to their
embodiment and role in any public doctrine or practice.”).
139
Neuman, supra note 127, at 1868. Michael Addo speaks of a “transubstantiation of moral ideals into
law.” ADDO, supra note 7, at 154.
140
FINNIS, supra note 60, at 3.
141
BUCHANAN, supra note 35, at 18 (discussing GRIFFIN, supra note 35). For a critical discussion of the
“mirroring view,” see id. at 50–56.
142
Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted).
143
Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 225, 226 (2009).
144
DIALOGUES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL PLURALISM, supra note 125, at 3.

KAY_6.22.22

2022]

6/23/2022 2:36 PM

NORMATIVE SYSTEMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

1607

imperceptible transformation of a political concept into the legal domain.”145
The association of legal rights with previously acknowledged moral rights,
moreover, may enhance the regard that the codified right enjoys in the relevant
society, and thus it can increase the extent to which that right is observed. The
legal right becomes endowed with what Gerald Neuman calls a “suprapositive”
character.146 Prior moral norms may also end up playing a part in the way legal
institutions interpret and enforce the legal right.147 This does not mean that every
legal individual right will have a moral counterpart. As Buchanan notes, “[l]egal
rights [are] . . . human creations, can serve a number of different purposes and
can be justified by appeal to a number of different kinds of moral considerations,
of which moral rights are only one.”148
Certainly, not every interaction between sets of human rights originating in
different normative systems will be harmonious or lead to mutual reinforcement.
Inevitably, tensions, if not conflicts, arise in a world crowded with normative
systems. Neuman has pointed out the difficulties of simultaneous compliance
with the “[t]wo leading systems [that] exist today for protecting the fundamental
rights of individuals”: domestic constitutions and international instruments.149
Neuman writes that “[b]oth systems assert an ultimate authority to evaluate
whether governmental practices comply with fundamental rights, and each
system sits potentially in judgment over the other.”150 These complications may
be exacerbated by the evolving interpretations of given rights developed by
international agencies and tribunals and municipal constitutional courts. This
“may leave a state bound by an obligation to which it did not intentionally
consent, or indeed could not constitutionally consent.”151
National constitutions and international legal obligations thus create the
possibility of conflicting positive law systems. The same kind of problem arises
in many other situations. The norms of the family, the church, or the tribe may
also contradict those of the state.152 A much noted example involves the equality
145

ADDO, supra note 7, at 9.
Neuman, supra note 127, at 1868.
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BUCHANAN, supra note 35, at 11.
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rights regimes”).
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Neuman, supra note 127, at 1875.
152
See Carol Weisbrod, Women and International Human Rights: Some Issues Under the Bridge, in
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DEMOCRACIES 403, 405–10 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000) (discussing tensions between religious and secular
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rights of women, protected by the widely adopted Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the rights protected in this
convention may clash with obligatory rules of certain religious communities.153
In this case and others, conflicts might be resolved by consulting an implicit or
explicit hierarchy of normative systems, based on the affected individual’s
evaluation of the relative authority of each system. So, for many, divine law
must prevail over the law of the state, a conclusion we may trace back at least to
Antigone’s defiance of royal commands in Sophocles’s play.154 The same
priority was embraced by Blackstone when he wrote that the laws of nature,
“dictated by God himself, [are] of course superior in obligation to any other . . .
[and] no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this”155—a dictum that
was at that very time being lived out by American revolutionaries insisting that
they had been “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.”156
Notwithstanding the theoretical difficulties spawned by multiple and
conflicting normative orders, we know by experience that they need not lead to
legal, moral, or political gridlock. Most of the time, we find ways to manage any
contradictions. To the extent there are institutions administering the various
systems, they can, and often do, find ways to accommodate conflicting demands
on their subjects or adherents. In making their own decisions, they can take into
account the existence of other normative systems. Thus, a number of national
constitutions provide for explicit recognition of the customary law of indigenous
communities, though subject to various limitations and exceptions.157 Likewise,
states sometimes adopt religious rules to govern marriage and family relations
and vest the administration of those rules in religious institutions.158 Conversely,
religious authorities may surrender their idiosyncratic practices to fixed state
requirements. A well-known example is the protracted legal and political contest
over the Mormon institution of plural marriage in the nineteenth century,
concluding with the church’s revision of its marriage rules.159 Several national
constitutions, moreover, expressly incorporate international human rights law in
norms).
153
Carol Weisbrod, Universals and Particulars: A Comment on Women’s Human Rights and Religious
Marriage Contracts, 9 S. CAL. REV. L & WOMEN’S STUD. 77, 78 (1999).
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SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE ll. 503–05 (trans. Roberts Fagles, ca. 441 B.C.E) (“Nor did I think your edict
had such force/ that you, a mere mortal, could override the gods,/ the great unwritten, unshakable traditions.”).
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For a review of the law in several such jurisdictions, see, e.g. Benjamen Franklen Gussen, A
Comparative Analysis of Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal Peoples, 40 MELB. U. L. REV. 867 (2017).
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See Carol Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious
Authority, 26 J. FAM. L. 741, 754–57 (1988).
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their legal systems and, in some cases, invest it with the same status as the
constitution itself.160 Less formally, officials may construe individual rights in
municipal law to conform to their understanding of international human rights
dealing with the same subject matter. The “suprapositive” rights identified by
Neuman may “supply an external standard of normative evaluation, which the
legal system fully or partially internalizes as a positive fundamental right.”161
This may give such rights a broader scope than would be the case were they
lacking this connection to some independent human rights system. More
generally, it is reasonable to hope that the various normative codes—codes that,
after all, often develop and coexist in the same society—will influence each
other and will, to some extent, converge, thus reducing the occasions for
conflict.162
CONCLUSION
In the end, it is necessary to recognize that what we casually call “human
rights” are actually aspects of different normative systems and that none of these
systems is the “real,” primitive system. Acknowledgment of this fact works a
major qualification on the assumption that human rights “are properly attributed
on a universal basis to all human beings.”163 This is not news to anyone familiar
with the international legal embodiments of human rights, which consist of
different sets of rights created in different places by different people employing
different processes, and which are interpreted and enforced by different
institutions. Typically, moreover, they are applied with an eye to the different
historical and cultural environments of the places where violations are alleged
to have occurred by agencies that will show considerable deference to the
decisions made by responsible authorities.164 And, at least in international law,
when these practices are judged insufficient to prevent interference with critical
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interests and values in the regulated societies, the states party to human rights
treaties have yet another option: to adhere to the treaty but only with specific
reservations, further fragmenting the supposed universality of the rights at
issue.165
None of this is to say that “human rights” talk is incoherent or unproductive.
While it is impossible to specify its exact contents, there can be an “overlapping
consensus”166 consisting of widely condemned treatments or practices. Charles
Beitz has posited a model of human rights protecting “urgent individual
interests”—those “recognizable as important in a wide range of typical lives”
but that need not be “possessed . . . or desired by everyone.”167 What this formula
lacks in precision, it may make up in its rough congruence with what most
people mean by “human rights” most of the time. But this and any other attempt
to sum up the essential character of human rights will fail to capture some rights
that have been adopted in one or another international or regional human rights
treaty, just as it will include others that may be widely disputed in some
circumstances and in some places. As I hope the exposition here has shown,
some incongruity is a necessary consequence of the fact that the same term—
“human rights”—has been appropriated by different normative orders, created
for diverse purposes, and imbued with diverse authority.
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